Condies Foods Incorporated v. Board of Review of Industrial Commision of Utah, Department of Employment Security, and Tharilyn C. Chun : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Condies Foods Incorporated v. Board of Review of
Industrial Commision of Utah, Department of
Employment Security, and Tharilyn C. Chun : Brief
of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Emma R. Thomas; Attorney for Respondents.
Virginia Curtis Lee; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Condies Foods Incorporated v. Board of Review of Industrial Commision of Utah, No. 940407 (Utah Court of Appeals,
1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6059
c 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. <W04o+-cA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONDIES FOODS INCORPORATED, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and 
THARILYN C. CHUN, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 940407-CA 
DES Appeals # 94-A-783 
Board of Review # 94-BR-129 
BRIEF OF EMPLOYER-PETITIONER 
Petition for Review 
from the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security 
Argument Priority Classification: 
EMMA R. THOMAS U.S.B. # 4681 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
140 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. 0. BOX 11600 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84147 
Telephone: (801) 536-7400 
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE - U.S.B. # 1923 
ATTORNEY FOR EMPLOYER-PETITIONER 
CONDIES FOODS INCORPORATED 
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105-1923 
Telephone: (801) 583-0625 
FAX: (801) 583-5641 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 2 13S4 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONDIES FOODS INCORPORATED, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and 
THARILYN C. CHUN, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 940407-CA 
DES Appeals # 94-A-783 
Board of Review # 94-BR-129 
BRIEF OF EMPLOYER-PETITIONER 
Petition for Review 
from the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security 
Argument Priority Classification: 
EMMA R. THOMAS U.S.B. # 4681 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
140 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. 0. BOX 11600 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84147 
Telephone: (801) 536-7400 
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE - U.S.B. # 1923 
ATTORNEY FOR EMPLOYER-PETITIONER 
CONDIES FOODS INCORPORATED 
1458 PRINCETON AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105-1923 
Telephone: (801) 583-0625 
FAX: (801) 583-5641 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 2 
C. Disposition in Agency 3 
D. Statement of Facts 
Relevant to the "Just Cause" Test 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 20 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BOARD 
FAILED TO APPLY THE "JUST CAUSE" TEST 
TO THE SUBSTANTIAL HEARING EVIDENCE 
THAT ESTABLISHED CULPABILITY, KNOWLEDGE 
AND CONTROL 21 
A. Culpability 25 
B. Knowledge 27 
C. Control 29 
D. Relief of Charges 31 
CONCLUSION 32 
ADDENDUM 
January 25, 1994 Separation Notice 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 
782 P.2d 965 (Utah App.1989) 21 
Kehl v. Board of Review, 
700 P.2d 1129, 1135 (Utah 1985) 21,22 
Law Office of David Paul White v. Board of Review, 
778 P.2d 21 (Utah App.1989) 1,22,27,28,29,30 
Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 
115 P.2d 439 (Utah App.1989) 22 
Stegen v. Department of Employment Security, 
751 P.2d 1160 (Utah.App.1988) 22 
Rules 
R562-5b-102, Utah Administrative Code 22,24 
R562-5b-102(l)(a), Utah Administrative Code 25,26 
R562-5b-102(l)(b), Utah Administrative Code 28 
R562-5b-102(l)(c), Utah Administrative Code 30 
R562-7c-4(f ), Utah Administrative Code 31 
Statutes 
Section 35-4-5b(l), Utah Code Annotated (1993) 2,21,31 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1994) 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CONDIES FOODS INCORPORATED, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and 
THARILYN C. CHUN, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 940407-CA 
DES Appeals # 94-A-783 
Board of Review # 94-BR-129 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The sole issue presented for review on appeal is whether the 
Department's and the Board's failure to apply the "just cause" 
standard to the substantial hearing evidence that established 
culpability, knowledge and control exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality? 
In Law Office of David Paul White v. Board of Review, 778 P. 2d 
21, 23 (Utah App.1989), Judge Garff observed: 
Whether an employee is terminated for "just cause" 
is a mixed question of law and fact. Pro-Benefit 
Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, lib P.2d 439, 441 
(Utah App.1989). 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, review of mixed 
questions of law and fact provides for relief in the event the 
petitioner has been substantially prejudiced when the Board 
erroneously interprets or applies the law. The Boardfs application 
of factual findings to the law must be reversed if the 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute is Section 35-4-5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1993): 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(b)(1) For the week in which the claimant was 
discharged for just cause or for an act or omission in 
connection with employment, not constituting a crime, 
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Review of 
the Utah Industrial Commission ("Board") that affirmed an award of 
unemployment compensation benefits by the Department of Employment 
Security ("Department") to Tharilyn C. Chun ("Chun"). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On January 14, 1994, Chun applied for unemployment benefits. 
(R. 1-3, 16-19) On February 4, the Department awarded Chun 
benefits "because the reason for discharge was not disqualifying." 
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(R. 20) On February 14, Condies Foods Incorporated ("Condies") 
appealed the Department's award of benefits. (R. 21-24) 
On March 16, following a lengthy hearing, the Department's 
Appeals Tribunal affirmed the Department's award. (R. 167-172) On 
April 4, Condies appealed that decision to the Board. (R. 175-181) 
On June 17, the Board affirmed the Department's March 16 
decision, then sent the employer's notice to a stranger. (R. 212-
216, 232-235) On July 15, Condies appealed the Board's June 17 
decision to this Court. (R. 220-222) 
C. Disposition in Agency 
The Board affirmed the Department's award of unemployment 
compensation benefits to Chun. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to the "Just Cause" Test 
The Department and the Board made findings relevant to the 
"willful and wanton" standard set forth in Section 35-4-5(b)(l) 
(1993), which the Board and Department applied. Those findings are 
irrelevant under the "just cause" standard the Board and Department 
failed to apply. The following facts are relevant to an 
application of the "just cause" test. 
1. On February 11, 1992, Condies hired Chun as a fresh 
vegetable production worker. (R. 1, 74, 76) 
Specifically Warned of Termination 
if Intolerable Paging Continued 
2. On November 5, 1993, when Chun was a quality assurance 
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technician, Bruce Black, Condies1 Plant Manager, specifically 
warned Chun about repeatedly paging supervisors and managers to ask 
them nuisance questions. Black warned Chun if the intolerable 
paging continued her job would be in jeopardy: 
BBlack: (It) was November 5, it was a Saturday; I 
came in to work about 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock in the 
morning, Uh, Saturday is a light production day when we 
have a skeleton crew, maybe a third of our normal crewfs 
there. We schedule one QA technician to be on duty 
during that period of time. 
BBlack: ...When I went through the facility, when 
I stopped at every crew, and uh, discussed with the 
supervisor problems or how things were running, every 
single supervisor in this incident, uh, conveyed to me 
that they were upset at Tharyn for repeated, during the 
morning, nuisance pages concerning what you think how he 
had done today, uh, when would your crew be done. These 
aren't pertinent to her duties, such as weight problems 
or food safety issues— 
BBLack: Yes, she—she would page from the quality 
assurance lab, uh, the supervisor would hear the page, 
have to stop their work, walk to the nearest phone, pick 
it up and ask for the page. 
Judge: Okay. And—and—and these people said 
that she was calling about such things as what are my 
schedule, when will I be off— 
BBlack: When will I be off, what time are your 
crew get done— 
» » * 
BBlack: Some of the supervisors were physically 
upset that this had been going on all morning and 
disrupting them numerous times. And this isn't the first 
time wefve had problems with her. I know Elliott and 
also, uh, Scott and Mike had discussed these problems 
with her. This is one our main concerns, you know, 
disrupting people for, uh, reasons that were not 
approved. 
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BBlack: .,.1 went to Ray McDougal, who was our 
operations manager that day, and I said, "Ray, since I've 
been here, I've noticed Tharilynfs paged a number of 
times, plus in discussing with the supervisors, some of 
them are quite upset. This has been going on all 
morning." 
BBlack: Ray says, "Yes, Bruce, it seems to be a 
normal thing on Saturday when she's here." (He says,) 
"She's paged me already a number of times today with 
repeatedly asking some times the same question, like 
"when do you think I'll go home today?" And I said, 
"Well, I'll go talk to her, because we have discussed 
this specifically with her in the past." 
BBlack: So at that time I walked to the Quality 
Assurance Lab, I found Tharilyn sitting in the lab at the 
desk. I was somewhat irritated by the situation, because 
this isn't the first time it's happened that we've talked 
to her about it, and I went to her somewhat in a harsh 
voice and I said, "Tharilyn," I said, "I've just gone 
through the facility and a number of the supervisors are 
upset by this repeated paging and—and disturbing them 
for nuisance reasons." And I said, "We've talked to you 
about this before, and you need to knock it off. And if 
you don't, you need to understand that your job's in 
jeopardy. 
Judge: Okay. Did she acknowledge that she had 
done that day, or did she dispute it" 
BBlack: She didn't dispute it, she sat at the desk 
and her—her answer was, "Okay, I'll do that." 
Judge: Okay, okay. You did tell her that if she-
-if it continued, that she'd be terminated? 
BBLack: Yes, I did. (R. 81-83; emphasis added) 
3. Chun did not dispute Bruce Black's testimony at the 
hearing: 
Judge: Mmhmm. Did anyone ever come to you and 
say you were paging too much? 
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Chun: Bruce Black (one) night, uh, November 5th* 
Judge: What was your response to him? 
Chun: "Fine." (R. 128) 
Transfer from QA to Security Supply 
4. About ten (10) days later on November 15, 1993, Condies 
transferred Chun to the Security/Supply Department- Condies 
maintained Chun at her QA rate of pay. The transfer from QA to 
Security/Supply was due to Chun's deteriorating job performance and 
to accommodate light-duty restrictions her doctors had imposed for 
off-the-job injuries. (R. 77-78) Chun acknowledged Condies told 
her the transfer was due to complaints from people with whom Chun 
worked. (R. 120) Chun wrote Condies a letter thanking Condies for 
their extraordinary consideration of her circumstances and 
committing to improve her job performance. (R. 51# 54# 143-145) 
The Department found: 
In the early fall of 1993, the claimant asked to be 
reassigned from the quality assurance technician 
position, which was primarily on the night shift, to a 
light-duty plan production position on the day shift. 
The shift preference play no part in her request, but the 
position she requested was only available on the day 
shift. 
The employer agreed to consider her transfer request, but 
they elected to transfer the claimant to a completely 
different kind of work on a temporary basis while they 
made their decision. The claimant accepted that 
temporary reassignment, which was called "supply-
security," and consisted of working in the supply room at 
the plant entrance, where she checked employees in and 
out of the plant, and issued equipment and supplies as 
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needed. (R. 168) 
5. Prior to transferring Chun from QA to Security/Supply, 
Bruce Black, Scott Black, then QA Manager, Elliott Maw, the former 
QA Manager, and Mike Gordon, Condies1 QA Supervisor, had had a 
number of discussions with Chun about Chun's deteriorating job 
performance: 
Judge: And while she was still working as a 
quality check technician, did she, uh, agree or did she 
disagree with you that her performance was deteriorating? 
BBlack: She agreed with me, when I confronted her 
with her problems, that she would do a better job, 
indicating to me that she recognized there was a 
deterioration. 
Judge: Did she offer some explanation for the 
reason for the deterioration in her performance? 
BBlack: No, she just told me she'd do a better 
job. 
Judge: What did—did you form any opinion as to 
why—why that was happening? 
BBLack: The only conclusion I can come to is her 
attitude, she just didn't care any more. (R. 78-79) 
6. Mike Gordon, Condies' Quality Assurance Supervisor, 
testified at the hearing about Chun's attitude and doubting Chun's 
honesty and integrity: 
Judge: And—and so if you know about elements of 
dishonesty that they don't know about, you're not the one 
who decided to fire her. 
Gordon: No. 
Judge: Were you involved in the discharge? 
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Gordon: No I was not. 
Judge: They're irrelevant for dismissal, are they 
not? 
Gordon: Yes, but they are relevant to the fact 
that thatfs why Scott Black and myself went to Bruce and 
asked her—asked him that we just could not work with her 
anymore in the department, because No. 1, I — I doubted 
the honesty and integrity and—and I need to have that 
trust— (R. 154-159) 
Intolerable Paging Continues after Transfer to Security/Supply 
7. The problems continued after Chun was transferred to 
Security/Supply: 
BBlack: The problems just continued on. I'm not 
over (the Security/Supply) department, that's headed by 
Keith Ross, but the individuals that worked in the 
department with Tharilyn would come to me and ask for 
help, "Can't you do something about Tharilyn's problem: 
Using phone use, paging, it's just getting ridiculous, we 
need some help." (R. 80) 
8. Keith Ross, Condies' Sales/Customer Relations and 
Security/Supply Manager, testified that while in Security/Supply 
Chun paged people in the facility, interrupting them to get answers 
to inane questions. 
Judge: We've had some talk about that. How— 
where did you first learn about that? 
Ross: Well, the supervisor came to me ex—upset 
that he kept getting paged off the line. 
Judge: Was this be—after she was in your 
department" 
Ross: Yes, yes. 
Ross: ...typically it was something wanting to 
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know when to get off work or—or something simple 
question that could have been answered at a different 
time, or the people sign out items out of—out of the 
supply room and, uh, she neglected to get a signature, 
for example, and she wanted that signature immediately, 
except you could pick that guy up later when he came back 
in, whatever. 
Judge: So his complaint then was that she had 
called to page—to get a person off the line to sign out 
for something, that uh— 
Ross: Right. Numer—I think that happened quite 
a few times, one of the circumstances myself, it also 
happened, were—I work in an open office environment. 
When I'm meeting with customers on the telephone, I may 
have somebody in at my desk, like an outside salesperson, 
'cause I do some purchasing also, where she would walk 
right in with a—say want to talk about the schedule for 
next week... 
. . . 
Ross: And it was quite common for her to come 
into my office and do that. And it's the same type of 
thing with the paging. 
Judge: Mmhmm. Well, I appreciate that. I'm—I'm 
[indiscernible] to know whether that was simply a matter 
of an individual who doesn't understand priorities and 
who—who's insensitive to that or someone who knows 
better and is—and—and doesn't care. 
Ross: I think she understood. I went and had, 
uh, like—we have an office where you can go and sit in 
private and talk about things, and I guess in the way it 
works for me in that type of environment, I work with 
them and try and get 'em to the point. I took her into 
that office and—on several occasions, two or three times 
at least, and went into detail of why I didn't want to be 
interrupted or why a supervisor.... 
Judge: What kind of a response did you get from 
her in that, uh, after that conversation? 
Ross: That type of conversation where she'd say, 
"I understand, I'll try to [do] better. I'll work at it. 
I understand." 
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Judge: Is there any way you can put an 
approximate time period as to when that discussion took 
place? Relative to how—before she was separated? 
Ross: Uh, well, she came like November 15th. I 
would think one time shortly after going to work and 
maybe within the first week or two, and probably another 
coup—time in December. 
Judge: After the one in December, uh, was there 
improvement, uh, deterioration, or no change in her 
behavior? 
Ross: I think no change. I don—I think her— 
there may be for a few days you wouldn't notice the pages 
or wouldn't have to, you know, within it and then you'd 
have them again. And somebodyfd come to me and say, 
"We've got a lot of pages again." Uh, I know we had an 
occurrence, I'm not sure of the date on it, Saturday, 
when she was trying to find out numerous times, you know, 
"When—when are the crews going to be through so I know 
when I'm going home" type thing. 
Judge: Mmhmm. Was there a—a time after the 
December one that was a specific violation that you 
believe was a, uh, [rose to] the level of the, say, 
misconduct on the job? 
Ross: Well, when some of the thing is repeated 
over and over again, so— 
Judge: Oh, yeah, after—after the December 
warning, when you—you thought she understood and she 
said she'd do better, was there another violation? 
Ross: I think [indiscernible] there were several 
times where she would get in a situation where she paged 
too much. (R. 89-90) 
Continued Intolerable Paging Leads to Imposed Leave of Absence 
9. Chun's nuisance pages of supervisors and managers 
interfered with crew functioning and, plant operation. Those 
disruptive pages led to Chun being placed on an involuntary leave 
10 
of absence: 
Judge: .••I'm trying to describe—decide if there 
was some kind of deliberate or willful misconduct on her 
part, other than the pages that you've told me about. 
Is—is that all that you know of, uh—? 
Ross: That's the only thing, the continual 
interrupting of people doing their jobs, which, if you 
talk about a supervisor in our—in our information, a 
supervisor in our facility is part of the work crew, — 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Ross: —and as part of that work crew, and if 
they're disrupted and taken away from that crew, then 
that—that disrupts not just that person, it disrupts 
that whole crew that they're on. 
Judge: Well, the last time I understand that she-
-you had any concern about her disrupting the crew was, 
uh, in that December—that December meeting? 
Ross: Somewhere in the December time frame. 
Judge: And that would have been about—where— 
when in December? 
Ross: [indiscernible] probably around the, you, 
know, we had—with the holidays in there and everything 
else suspended. 
Judge: And her actually, uh, being put on the 
leave was to place on—when? 
Ross: As I remember, January 4th. (R. 95-96; 
emphasis added) 
10. Joan Fernstaedt, Condies' Personnel Manager, spoke with 
Chun about her poor job performance in Security/Supply: 
Judge: Did you speak with her about those 
complaints, too. 
Fernstaedt: I told her, uh, on various occasions 
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- Keith was even in the room when we did this - — 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Fernstaedt: —uh, we met with her twice about 
complaints from the people she worked with and complaints 
from the supervisors that came to, uh, to the, uh, supply 
department [indiscernible] 
Judge: [indiscernible] specific about what the 
complaints were? 
Fernstaedt: About the phone calls, yes. And—and 
about the, uh, paging and about the message for the 
phone. (R. 110-111) 
11. Fernstaedt spoke with Chun about the nuisance pages: 
Fernstaedt: I just told her that there were 
complaints and numerous complaints from supervisors that 
she was continually paging when she should not. 
Judge: Okay. (R. 116) 
Final Incident 
12. On December 28, 1993, Chun's last night on the job, Chun 
paged the assistant operations manager and other supervisors all 
night long: 
Judge: Okay. These—these things about the 
calls, urn, the pages that seemed to be disrupting the 
work force, your conclusion, the, I — I think you told me, 
uh, you concluded that was just her own decision to do 
that and not—not the effects of the drugs that caused 
her to do that? 
Fernstaedt: Uh, yes. And—and by the one 
documentation that I had, which was from the 28th, uh, 
the assistant operations manager - I had that for that I 
showed you here -
Judge: Mmhmm. 
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Fernstaedt: —urn, the assistant operations manger 
came to me with—with an [indiscernible] that he had 
written the night before, uh, complaining - it was around 
12:28 - and this was after the discussions continued, and 
this was only with [indiscernible] in there,— 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Fernstaedt: Uh, "Tharilyn called supervisors all 
night long, asked what time they were turning in their 
stuff, asked what time they were going home, asked when— 
where are you 2-lb. weights, bothering the supervisor 
when they were tying to get their work done—" 
Judge: And who wrote that? 
Fernstaedt: This is Jim Tell [Talent], I mean, 
this is my notes that he—when he came to me the next 
morning and complained about it, and he had wrote his own 
note— 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Fernstaedt: —the night before. (R. 102-103) 
13. No one but Chun repeatedly paged supervisors, managers 
and other employees, disrupting plant operations to ask nuisance 
questions: 
Judge: ...it would be inappropriate for her to 
ask a supervisor what time they were gonna be finished 
for the day? 
Fernstaedt: And what time they were turning their 
things in. The other-other people that have worked there 
for years and years and years have never done this. 
Judge: They don't ask— 
Fernstaedt: No. 
... 
Fernstaedt: Okay. Uh, I do not believe that 
anything that she had to do would be anything that the 
other three ladies that work in that department would not 
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have to do also, and they've been there a lot longer than 
she has. I'm there, uh, 8:00, 9:00, 10:00, 11:00 o'clock 
at night; I have never heard anybody paging these 
employees except her. (R. 104, 115) 
Chun Offered No Reasonable Explanation Her Paging 
14. When questioned by the judge at the hearing, Chun agreed 
that her paging was unnecessary and offered no reasonable 
explanation for the intolerable pages she continued to make weeks 
after being warned she would be terminated: 
Judge: I'm talking about the pages that you made 
when you were in security. 
Chun: Oh. Urn,— 
Judge: Did he ever— did anybody ever say you 
were making too many of those? 
Chun: I think Keith Ross did. 
Judge: What was he complaining about? what did— 
what were you paging for at that time? 
Chun: They say it was to find out when I was 
going home, but there are things that you need to do 
before you can go home.... 
Judge: In security what do you have to do before 
you go home? 
Chun: You have to grab the clothes, you have to 
put away all the bags, set up everything for the next 
morning, and you have to do things before you can go 
home. 
Judge: Aren't there work schedules posted as to 
what time the shifts are gonna start and end? 
Chun: Mmhmm. 
Judge: So why do you need to know what time 
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they1re gonna be finished? 
Chun: So I can get the things done that I need 
to get done? 
Judge: Can't you get them done without paging? 
Judge: —couldn't you get—couldn't you 
synchronize yourself and couldn't you get everything done 
without bothering someone out on the line, paging them, 
calling them away from their work? 
Chun: Well, they say that I called them to ask 
them that. 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Chun: That's not what I asked them. I asked 
them where their 2.3508 is, because nobody seems to know 
where it is, I—I'm— 
Judge: That—that's something for using the 
scales to-? 
Chun: Yes. I'm in charge of keeping track of 
these things,— 
... 
Judge: Why not just say, "Well, it's all I know. 
Can't tell you any more"? 
Chun: I don't know. 
Judge: Could you have done that? 
Chun: Perhaps - I could have done that; perhaps 
I should have done that. 
Judge: ...what business is it of yours who's got 
it, or who's using it, or whether they're done or not? 
Chun: I guess my—my feeling of needing to know 
and being responsible for it. 
Judge: Did you raise that with them when they 
questioned you about it? 
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Chun: Yes, I did. 
Judge: What did they say when you told them that 
that!s how you felt: 
Chun: Same thing you told me. 
Judge: When you sa—you mean they—they said the 
same thing about what— 
Chun: Yeah. 
Judge: —what business— 
Chun: Being responsible— 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Chun: —they're responsible for it. 
Judge: Mmhmm. (R. 129-132) 
Chun Acknowledged She Had A Bad Attitude in Security/Supply 
15. Chun admitted that she was hostile toward Condies: 
Depression followed and I was removed from Q.A. and 
place (sic) in a box that I was totally unhappy with when 
I was promised to return to the floor (prep day) to 
continue my employment with Condies. That I never saw. 
More depression followed and my actions became 
hostile.... That aggravated me to push even harder in 
determination to get the job that I was promised.... In 
lack of control, I allowed myself to become overwhelmed 
with this unsatisfactory conduct with my employers, 
professionals, and began to rebel. I do not blame myself 
for these actions.... (R. 27-28) 
16. Chun resented "being crammed in that (Security/Supply) 
box." (R. 132) 
Chun: Okay, well, I—after a while I started 
begin depressed, because I was being stuck in this box, 
unhappy, not going out onto the floor, and I admit I did 
become hostile.... (R. 137) 
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Chun: ...I told them all I wanted to get out. 
I couldnft wait to get out, that Ifd be much happier 
being out on the floor working— 
Judge: Okay. 
Chun: —rather than being in here frustrated, 
flustered, and crammed. (R. 146) 
17. On the back of the first page her Claimant Statement of 
Job Discharge, Chun admitted: 
I don't particularly care what day it is being 
unhappy cramed (sic) in a box for 8 hrs a day. She 
(Fernstaedt) said I wasn't as sharp as I used to be. 
There (sic) no reason to be sharp in supply. (R. 17) 
18. Joan Fernstaedt, Condies' Personnel Manager, also 
testified about Chun's unauthorized use of the telephone on company 
time: 
Fernstaedt: (Keith Ross' employees in 
Security/Supply) said she was continually making phone 
calls and begging doctors and dentists for, um, more 
prescription drugs— 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Fernstaedt: —and they turned her down, and she 
would make phone calls and make phone calls. 
... 
Judge: Is that—did anyone, after hearing the she 
had been making too many calls, go and tell her that 
she's not to do that anymore? 
Fernstaedt: I discussed it with her myself on 
various occasions. 
Judge: When's the last time you discussed it with 
her, before she was put on suspension? 
Fernstaedt: Well, we even discussed it the day 
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that we placed her on suspension. 
Judge: ...You personally did not, or you did, 
tell her that she was not to use the phone for personal 
use? 
Fernstaedt: [silence] I discussed the situation 
with her and in discussing it I would have, you know, 
said it's not the policy. (R. 98-100 ) 
19. Fernstaedt also testified about dishonest behavior of 
Chun's. (R. 160-162) 
Investigation into Reason for Deteriorating Job Performance 
20. On January 4, 1994, "for the safety and well-being of 
Chun and her co-workers,11 Condies placed Chun on an imposed leave 
of absence "to allow Chun time to become healthy and assure her 
doctors and Condies that she can safely work here." (R. 50, 139) 
21. Condies conducted an investigation to ascertain the 
reason for Chun's deteriorating job performance: 
Fernstaedt: ...we just wanted to determine 
whether her performance had anything to do with all these 
mixed, urn, prescription medicines she was taking or 
whether it was, uh, continued po—po—poor performance of 
her own will. 
Judge: This is one of the things you investigated 
then? 
Fernstaedt: Exactly. 
Judge: What conclusion did you reach? 
Fernstaedt: I got three letters from (doctors) 
and they— which are included there—which we felt showed 
that she was not under the influence of drugs, and that 
this was willful, continued, substandard performance. 
(R. 101-102, 114, 146-151) 
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22. James Ferguson, M.D, of Pharmacology Research 
Corporation, 448 East 6400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, confirmed 
that Chun did not have a drug problem. (R. 64, 138-140) 
23. Chun's physicians at Riverton Family Practice, Drs. Lee, 
Olson, Jack and Ross, confirmed that Chun did not have a drug 
problem. (R. 136) 
24. Chun's orthopedic physician, Bruce Newton, M.D., at the 
Salt Lake Clinic, confirmed that Chun did not have a drug problem. 
(R. 136) 
25. If Chun had had a prescription drug abuse problem, 
Condies would have kept Chun on and worked to help her overcome her 
problem: 
Judge: Suppose she'd found out that, uh, the 
doctor's opinion was that she was over-medicated and 
getting too many drugs from too many doctors, would you 
have kept her on in that case? 
Fernstaedt: Oh, certainly. 
Judge: So, if— 
Fernstaedt: We'd given her leave of absence after 
leave of absence, uh, with a doctor's recommendation, and 
if he felt he could've, uh, if—if this—I think that we 
would have kept her on, uh, that's the company policy. 
If it was medication,— 
Judge: Mmhmm. 
Fernstaedt: —uh, we would have worked with the 
doctors and put her on a leave to try and make her a—a 
good, useful employee. 
Judge: I'm with you. 
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Fernstaedt: I mean, I — I [indiscernible] and work 
on it. 
Judge: I understand. 
Fernstaedt: You wouldn't believe how hard we 
worked on it. (R. 113) 
Investigation Leads to Termination 
26. Condies concluded from letters from three of Chun's 
doctors that she was not under the influence of drugs. Condies 
could not weather the impact of Chun's substandard performance on 
company operations any more. (R. 55) On January 25, 1994, Condies 
terminated Chun for reasons of 1) "progressively deteriorating job 
performance since September 1992; 2) increasingly arbitrary, 
inconsiderate, oppositional attitude toward co-workers and 
supervisors; 3) extremely unacceptable attendance and tardy record, 
misuse of company phones and time in seeking medications; and 4) 
being dazed, medicated and unable to function safely at work." (R. 
72, 111-112; Hearing Exhibit 3 - omitted from Record, included 
herewith as Appendix 1) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The failure of the Department and the Board to apply the "just 
cause" fault standard to the substantial hearing evidence that 
established culpability, knowledge and control exceeded the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality. Condies has been substantially 
prejudiced by the application of the more stringent "willful and 
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wanton11 test, where the hearing evidence did not include abuse of 
drugs as a reason for termination. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BOARD 
FAILED TO APPLY THE "JUST CAUSE" TEST 
TO THE SUBSTANTIAL HEARING EVIDENCE 
THAT ESTABLISHED CULPABILITY, KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provides two separate 
tests to determine whether an individual is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. An individual may be "discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and 
adverse to the employer's rightful interest." Johnson v. 
Department of Employment Security, 782 P. 2d 965, 968-969 (Utah 
App.1989). (Emphasis added.) 
In 1983, discharge for "just cause" was added to Section 35-4-
5(b)(1) as a further reason for denying unemployment benefits and 
constitutes a separate standard from the deliberate, willful, or 
wanton standard. Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P. 2d 1129, 1135 
(Utah 1985). Thereafter, the Department proposed administrative 
rules and regulations requiring three factors to establish a 
finding of fault: culpability, knowledge and control. These three 
factors, not willfulness, are essential for a determination of 
ineligibility under the definition of "just cause." Kehl, at 1133-
34. In Kehl, the Utah Supreme Court held the Department's proposed 
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 just cause11 rule to be reasonable and rational. The Court adopted 
the three-prong test to find that an employee was discharged for 
"just cause." 
The Kehl test is codified in Utah Administrative Code R562-5b-
102 (1990). To establish "just cause" the employer must show: (1) 
the employee's culpability, (2) his or her knowledge of the 
expected conduct, and (3) that the offending conduct was within the 
employee's control. See also Law Office of David Paul White v. 
Board of Review, 778 P. 2d 21 (Utah App.1989); Pro-Benefit Staffing, 
Inc. v. Board of Review, 115 P.2d 439 (Utah App.1989); and Stegen 
v. Department of Employment Security, 7 51 P. 2d 1160 
(Utah.App.1988). 
Since 1985, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have relied 
exclusively on the "just cause" test in analyzing and determining 
eligibility for benefits in discharge cases, except where an 
employee has been discharged for a drug offense. Only in drug 
offense discharges is eligibility for benefits determined under the 
"willful and wanton" standard. 
This Case 
At first blush, this discharge appeared to involve an employee 
whose poor on-the-job attitude and performance might have resulted 
from Chun's abuse of prescription drugs. Condies1 initial January 
1994 response to Chun's claim, prepared by Condies' attorney while 
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Condies investigated the possible drug abuse, reflected this 
concern. (R. 4-15) 
From its investigation, Condies concluded that Chun was not 
under the influence of drugs. Condies1 owner and plant manager, 
Bruce Black, determined that Condies could not weather the impact 
of Chun's substandard attitude and performance on company 
operations any more. (R. 55-56) On January 25, 1994, Condies 
terminated Chun primarily for reasons of progressively 
deteriorating job performance; increasingly arbitrary, 
inconsiderate, oppositional attitude toward co-workers and 
supervisors; and extremely unacceptable attendance and tardy 
record. (R. 111-112) In its Employerfs Additional Statement to 
the Appeals Tribunal, Condies clarified the facts concerning Chun's 
performance, attitude and attendance in the context of the "just 
cause" standard. That statement did not mention drug abuse. (R. 
32-47) 
The Department Failed to Apply the "Just Cause" Test in the Hearing 
At the outset of the March 14, 1994, administrative hearing, 
the Department noted: 
...In our pre-hearing conference, I, uh, asked for 
an explanation of what will be the—the grounds for the 
termination the employer will present, and the employer 
responded that they did not discharge the claimant for 
matters, uh, involved in drug use or drug abuse, uh, 
despite the—the explanation about drugs in the earlier 
documents. Instead, she was discharged for the reasons 
given on the actual termination, uh, notice, which we 
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have, uh, we111 mark as evidence here. (R. 72) 
Nevertheless, the Department then announced its intention to apply 
the "willful and wanton" standard used to determine eligibility in 
drug offense discharges: 
...She doesn't get her unemployment if she's 
discharged for some deliberate, willful, or wanton act 
against the employer's interest.... So we're here to 
find out what the specific behavior was and what evidence 
do we have that it was deliberate and willful as opposed 
to inadvertent.... The purpose of my questions is to 
determine whether there is any identifiable misconduct, 
and if so, when it was and what it was. Also, whether— 
what evidence we have that was—that it was within her 
control.... (R. 73) 
The Department proceeded to hear and consider the evidence 
solely through the faulty "willful and wanton" filter. The 
Department totally disregarded the substantial hearing evidence 
that established "just cause." 
The Department's March 16, 1994, decision (R.167-172) 
formulaically cites the "just cause" requirements of R562-5b-102, 
but nowhere applies them. In its conclusion, the Department 
confused the "willful and wanton" and "just cause" tests: 
...If the employer alleges that the claimant was 
discharged for the reasons stated on the separation 
notice, they have not met their burden to show that there 
were any deliberate, willful or wanton acts by the 
claimant that rose to the levels of knowledge, control 
and culpability required to establish just cause for the 
purpose of denial of unemployment benefits... 
The Department utterly failed to apply the factors of 
culpability, knowledge and control to consider and analyze the 
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substantial "just cause" evidence presented at the administrative 
hearing. 
The Board Failed to Apply the Just Cause Test 
The Board "adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the Administrative Law Judge." (R. 212) Like the Department, 
the Board's decision never considered or weighed any of the 
substantial hearing evidence that established culpability, 
knowledge and control. The Board affirmed the Department's 
misapplication of the "willful and wanton act" test: 
The Board of Review finds no willful disregard by 
the claimant of the employer's interests. The weight of 
the evidence in the record shows that the claimant 
performed her employment duties to the best of her 
ability. If the claimant was abrasive or bossy, it was 
because of the nature of her job duties for the employer 
both as a quality controller and as a caretaker of the 
employer's goods in Security Supply.... (R. 234) 
Gratuitously, and without competent evidence, the Board found and 
concluded: 
...The claimant's "excessive paging" was the result of 
the stress both in her job in Quality Assurance and in 
the new completely unfamiliar job duties associated with 
Security Supply. The Board of Review finds that the 
employer failed to establish any of the elements of a 
just cause discharge.... (R. 234) 
A, Culpability 
The relevant administrative rule defines the culpability prong 
of the "just cause" test as follows: 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the 
severity of the offense as it affects continuance of the 
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employment relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the 
employer's rightful interests.. ..The wrongness of the 
conduct must be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the employer's 
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct 
will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be 
shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
Utah Admin. Code R562-5b-102(1)(a). 
The record indicates that Chunfs general work habits 
constituted culpable conduct to the extent that termination of 
Chun's employment was necessary to avoid both actual and potential 
harm to Condies' rightful interests. Chun's continued intolerable 
paging of managers, supervisors and co-workers, resulted in 
repeated complaints and continued, serious disruption of business, 
both when she was quality assurance technician (for sixteen months 
from July 13, 1992, through about November 15, 1993) and after she 
was reassigned to the supply/security department (November 15 -
December 28, 1993). Keith Ross, Chun's supervisor the six weeks 
she was in the light-duty supply/security department, testified 
that Chun was continuously paging and interrupting the managers and 
supervisors when they were busy and trying to perform their work 
responsibilities. Ross had numerous complaints from supervisors 
and managers that Chun was continually paging them or her co-
workers on a regular basis — for unnecessary reasons. 
In its March 16, 1994, decision the Department correctly 
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found: 
Those supervisors found the pages to be disruptive 
to their work, inasmuch as they had to leave their work 
area in order to answer them. Some of the employees 
regarded the pages as being unnecessary and deliberate 
interruption of their work, and they made reports to the 
employer to that effect. 
When questioned by the Department at the hearing, Chun agreed that 
her Intolerable, disruptive paging served no necessary purpose. 
Chun offered no reasonable explanation for the nuisance pages she 
continued to make weeks after being warned she would be terminated. 
(R. 129-132) 
On November 5, 1993, Bruce Black, Condies' Plant Manager, 
specifically warned Chun if the intolerable paging continued her 
job would be in jeopardy. Chun reasonably should have known that 
continued violation would interrupt Condies1 operations. In fact, 
the incessant paging did result in months of repeated complaints 
and continued, serious disruption of business. Chun's hostile 
refusal to stop making the disruptive, nuisance pages would only 
have continued to hurt Condies1 rightful interests. Chun had to 
go. 
Condies established the "culpability prong of the applicable 
"just cause" test. 
B. Knowledge 
In White, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the 
"knowledge" prong of the "just cause" test: 
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Utah Administrative Code R475-5b-2(l) (b) [renumbered 
R562-5b-102(l)(b)] states that lf[t]he employee must have 
had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer 
expected.!! The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted this 
rule to mean that " [k]nowledge may not be established 
unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the 
expected behavior or had a pertinent written policy, 
except in the case of a flagrant violation of a universal 
standard of behavior." Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P. 2d 
1129, 1133 (Utah 1985). Rule 475-5b-2(1)(b) indicates 
that one way of showing that the employee had knowledge 
of the expected conduct is to establish that the employee 
had been given a specific warning and an opportunity to 
correct the objectionable conduct. Id. 
778 P.2d at 24-25. 
The record indicates that Condies, on numerous occasions, gave 
Chun specific instruction regarding her disruptive paging. On 
November 5, 1993, Bruce Black warned Chun, still a quality 
assurance technician, about her repeated paging of the operations 
manager and supervisor, and interrupting them and their crews' work 
to ask unnecessary questions. Black warned Chun she could lose her 
job if the intolerable paging continued. Black gave Chun an 
opportunity to correct her paging behavior and her on-the-job 
personality. The paging continued after Chun was transferred to 
Security/Supply. 
Bruce Black, Joan Fernstaedt, Scott Black, Mike Gordon, 
Elliott Maw and Keith Ross frequently counseled Chun with regard to 
her disruptive paging, deteriorating job performance and on-the-job 
personality. In a private office in Security/Supply, Ross spoke 
with Chun in detail two or three times about why he and supervisors 
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did not want to be interrupted with unnecessary questions. Chun 
would improve her behavior for several days, then revert back to 
her former behavior. Condies continued to work with Chun for an 
extended period of time, hoping that she would improve her 
behavior. 
Chun continued her intolerable paging through December 28, 
when the final incident occurred. On December 28, 1993, Chun's 
last night on the job, Chun paged Jim Talent, Condies1 Assistant 
Operations Manager, and other supervisors all night long. Chun 
asked them what time they were turning in their stuff, what time 
they were going home, where were their 2-lb. weights, and bothered 
the supervisors when they were tying to get their work done. 
Around this time, Chun was also reported making telephone calls to 
various doctors begging for pain killers or other drugs. Condies 
decided then to place Chun on a forced, unpaid leave of absence 
while they investigated whether or not there was a bona fide 
medical reason for Chun's calls and poor job performance, and 
whether or not Chun was physically and mentally capable of 
continuing to work full-time. 
Condies more than met its burden on the "knowledge" prong of 
the "just cause" test. 
C. Control 
In White, supra, Judge Garff considered the "control" prong of 
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the ffjust cause11 test: 
The conduct must have been within the power and 
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent. Kehl, 
700 P.2d at 1134. Further, continued inefficiency, 
repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by 
ordinary, reasonable workers in similar circumstances, 
may be disqualifying depending on the reason and degree 
of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the 
employee." Utah Admin. Code R475-5b-2(1)(c) (2) 
[renumbered R562-5b-102(1)(c) ]. 
778 P.2d at 25. 
No one but Chun repeatedly paged supervisors, managers and 
other employees, disrupting plant operations to ask nuisance 
questions. 
The Department correctly found: 
The decision to terminate the claimant was based on 
the employer's assumption, after having learned from the 
claimants doctors, that they did not regard her as being 
physically unable to work in light-duty assignments, and 
that the medications she was taking had been properly and 
legally prescribed for her, and did not interfere with 
her ability to work, that the claimant's apparent 
abrasive interaction with co-workers and managers, and 
the other alleged infractions, could only have been due 
to deliberate and willful conduct within her control. 
Substantial evidence established that Chun had the power and 
capacity to control her behavior. In her Claimant Statement, Chun 
admitted her behavior was her fault: 
. . .1 don't particularly care what day it is being unhappy 
cramed (sic) in a box for 8 hrs a day. She (Fernstaedt) 
said I wasn't as sharp as I used to be. There (sic) no 
reason to be sharp in supply. (R. 17) 
Later, Chun acknowledged that spite got the better of her: 
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...my actions became hostile.... In lack of control, I 
allowed myself to become overwhelmed., and began to 
rebel. I do not blame myself for these actions.... (R. 
27-28) 
At the March 16, 1994, hearing Chun testified: 
...I was being stuck in this box, unhappy, not going out 
onto the floor, and I admit I did become hostile. ... (R. 
137) 
Chun's admitted hostility toward Condies is the real reason 
she continued her disruptive paging. This repeated, disruptive, 
and offensive on-the-job behavior was solely within her personal 
control. Chun's refusal to cease her paging, despite specific 
warning and repeated counseling, indicates continued inefficiency 
and lack of ordinary care to the point of being disqualifying. 
Condies established the "control" prong of the "just cause" 
fault test. Just cause does not require a showing of willfulness. 
D. Relief of Charges 
R562-7c-4(f), Utah Administrative Code (1987), provides that 
upon written request an employer may be relieved of charges when: 
The claimant was discharged from that employment for 
circumstances which would have resulted in a denial of 
benefits under Section 35-4-5(b)[l] of the Act. 
Substantial evidence of "just cause" shows that Condies 
discharged Chun under circumstances that should have resulted in a 
denial of benefits under Section 35-4-5(b). Therefore, Condies is 
entitled to relief of charges and specifically appeals the charge 
aspect of the Board's June 17, 1994, decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Department and the Board failed to apply the "just cause11 
fault standard to the substantial hearing evidence that established 
culpability, knowledge and control. Failure to apply the "just 
cause" fault standard exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. 
Condies has been substantially prejudiced by the Boardfs 
application of the more stringent "willful and wanton" test; the 
hearing evidence did not include abuse of drugs as a basis for 
Chun's discharge. 
This Court should reverse the Boardfs decision awarding Chun 
unemployment compensation benefits and hold that Chun is ineligible 
for benefits because Condies discharged her for "just cause." 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 1994. 
Resfceiqtfuftiy Submit ted, 
VIRGINIA CURTIS LEE 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, by her signature hereto, hereby certifies 
that she personally mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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EMMA R. THOMAS 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
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140 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P. 0. BOX 11600 
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THARILYN C. CHUN 
6214 LONGVIEW DRIVE 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
by U. S. mail, postage pre-paid, this 22nd day of September, 
1994. 
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